john hawks weblog

paleoanthropology, genetics and evolution

social dynamics

  • Civic allometry

    Sun, 2013-05-05 22:31 -- John Hawks

    An interesting article from Smithsonian magazine, about the mathematical study of cities: "Life in the city is essentially one giant math problem".

    Here's a passage quoting Geoffrey West, about the ways that different measures of a city exhibit allometry with population size:

    Remarkably, this phenomenon applies to cities all over the world, of different sizes, regardless of their particular history, culture or geography. Mumbai is different from Shanghai is different from Houston, obviously, but in relation to their own pasts, and to other cities in India, China or the U.S., they follow these laws. “Give me the size of a city in the United States and I can tell you how many police it has, how many patents, how many AIDS cases,” says West, “just as you can calculate the life span of a mammal from its body mass.”

    I've heard West speak about this population allometry. Obviously some of the most interesting cases are those where a city mismatches the expected relationships. But it is fascinating the way that so many aspects scale with a positive allometry -- getting proportionally greater as city size increases.

  • Social media, social dynamics, and the Dunbar number

    Fri, 2013-01-18 00:51 -- John Hawks

    Drake Bennett in Businessweek takes on evolutionary anthropology this week in a profile of Robin Dunbar ("The Dunbar Number, From the Guru of Social Networks"). If you don't know why Businessweek would be profiling a primatologist, then you probably don't know about Robin Dunbar's work with group size and communication.

    Dunbar proposed that the size of social groups is limited by our evolutionary history. Our social interactions require us to track social relationships with many people. People aren't capable of following the details of thousands of city-dwellers, we are better suited to follow details of a single city block. In Dunbar's model, we should be well adapted to track the number of people that would have occupied social groups in the distant past.

    Humans can keep track of only a limited number of people, and for most social primates the group size is even smaller. Dunbar's research on primate groups led him to believe that group size is correlated with brain size among species of social primates. Given this, we might expect that the exceptionally large size of the human brain would correspond to an exceptionally large group size. By drawing a regression among brain size and group size estimates for many primate species, Dunbar arrived at the prediction that human group size should be 150 people. That became known as the "Dunbar number".

    Later, as the article recounts, technologists interested in social networks such as Facebook and Twitter became interested in the concept. What if the sizes of social networks on these alternative media platforms is similarly limited by our evolutionary heritage? Surely there is big money to be made for the company that can use this evolutionary knowledge to make big money?

    But the naive understanding of a hard "number" limiting human social interactions doesn't fit the evolutionary evidence.

    Others, anthropologists and brain scientists in particular, challenge the evolutionary story Dunbar tells, arguing that it discounts other factors that might have driven the development of the big human brain—the pressure to figure out more efficient ways to forage, or the need to surmount the defense mechanisms of the plants and animals our ancestors wanted to eat. “Ecological pressures like avoiding predators, finding food and shelter, choosing habitats—all these kinds of decisions. I think they played a role” in brain growth, says Reader, the biologist.

    Researchers who’ve used different methods to measure the size of a person’s social circle have come up with numbers that don’t match Dunbar’s. One set of studies by the anthropologist Russell Bernard and the network scientist Peter Killworth found a mean social network size of 291. Another paper, published this month in the Journal of the American Statistical Association, came up with 611.

    Like many, I used to be annoyed about the idea of the "Dunbar number". Human hunter-gatherers have a huge range in actual group sizes, as do most social primates. A girl might be born in a group of 20, see that group swell or merge with other groups to 100 or more, transfer to a different group along with a sister, and marry outside her social group entirely. Over a lifespan, she may face many different group sizes, and have "tight" relationships with other individuals born more than a century apart.

    No single number could describe this complexity. People vary extensively in their social interactions and knowledge of other peoples' social lives. Some people track hundreds of others, some people are relative shut-ins and know only a few. Human environments are novel today in many ways relative to our evolutionary history, but the sheer scope of variation in sociality belies the notion that we come from a monolithic history. It makes about as much sense as saying that human mass is 65 kg and not recognizing the development (from 3 kg at birth) and extensive variation in mass among individuals.

    My attitude has softened toward the Dunbar number, because it does capture something about the scale of social networks. Humans are not all 65 kilograms, but more than 99 percent of adult humans are within factor of two of that. Most of the time, when articles describe the concept of the Dunbar number, they describe it in ways that signify scale rather than an exact number. From this article, for example:

    A paper published in 2011 found that on Twitter the average number of other people a user regularly interacts with falls between 100 and 200. And though the limit on how many Facebook friends one can have is a generous 5,000, the average user has 190—more than 150, but within what Dunbar sees as the margin of error.

    If 190 is within the margin of error of 150, we're talking about a scale within a factor of at least 1.3. And that's on a mean -- not on the actual variation.

    Cognitive limits do constrain our behavior. But species-wide cognitive limits have almost no ability to predict the sizes of particular groups. Hence orangutans, gorillas and chimpanzees have very different social group sizes despite similar brain sizes. And cognition isn't dedicated to a single social function; there are many:

    Morin likes to point out that it’s misleading to talk about a single Dunbar Number. Dunbar actually describes a scale of numbers, delimiting ever-widening circles of connection. The innermost is a group of three to five, our very closest friends. Then there is a circle of 12 to 15, those whose death would be devastating to us. (This is also, Dunbar points out, the size of a jury.) Then comes 50, “the typical overnight camp size among traditional hunter-gatherers like the Australian Aboriginals or the San Bushmen of southern Africa,” Dunbar writes in his book How Many Friends Does One Person Need? Beyond 150 there are further rings: Fifteen hundred, for example, is the average tribe size in hunter-gatherer societies, the number of people who speak the same language or dialect. These numbers, which Dunbar has teased out of surveys and ethnographies, grow by a factor of roughly three. Why, he isn’t sure.

    One way to look at it is scaling: Larger groupings are in some ways metagroups: composed themselves of smaller groups that can act semi-independently. These dynamics are limited in scope before the metagroups disintegrate under their own complexity.

    But I think the null hypothesis is that we are imposing this scaling on the data. A factor-of-three difference is just wide enough for an analyst to separate biological distributions without much overlap. Try to sort human activities into different sizes of groups, and you'll get a factor-of-three separation automatically.

    Are different "levels" of social relationship really adaptively different? If they are, we might be drawing upon different cognitive resources for different levels of relationship -- one kind of thinking for close friends, another kind for distant acquaintances. If instead the appearance of different levels is really just a consequence of mapping a continuous distribution into different sizes of groups, then the levels may not be adaptively different, and we may be using the same cognitive resources in ways scaled to our knowledge of the individuals involved. That adaptive question has to shape the way we conceive of limits on cognition, and the relationship between cognitive evolution and social dynamics. It will be more complicated than a single number.

    Synopsis: 
    A profile of primatologist Robin Dunbar shows Silicon Valley borrowing evolutionary ideas
  • Who did what to whom

    Tue, 2012-10-30 11:00 -- John Hawks

    A confluence of stories, one from the New York Times fashion section, by Henry Alford: "A Web of Answers and Questions", about Googling people you meet...

    “Obviously, one is always going to have to be discreet when talking about what you’ve found,” said Ms. [Kate] Fox, a director of the Social Issues Research Center in Oxford, England. “But our brains haven’t changed since the Stone Age, and humans are designed to live in small groups in which everyone knows one another. Googling is an attempt to recreate a primeval, preindustrial pattern of interaction.”

    ...and one from science writer Michael Balter, in Slate, about the evolution of human brain size: "Why Are Our Brains So Ridiculously Big?":

    How did our brains get so big? Researchers have put forward a number of possible explanations over the years, but the one with the most staying power is an idea known as the social brain hypothesis. Its chief proponent, psychologist Robin Dunbar of Oxford University, has argued for the past two decades that the evolution of the human brain was driven by our increasingly complex social relationships. We required greater neural processing power so that we could keep track of who was doing what to whom.

    I'm glad I'm not the one who has to write continual "Stone Age mind" stories. Personally I think van Schaik's idea about cultural intelligence (discussed in the article) has a lot more going for it than Dunbar's. We are only modestly better at tracking social interactions than other primates, while we are light years better at cultural learning. Googling people is an application of technology to enable us to work effectively in a society in which our economic interactions are mostly with strangers. That doesn't make the world more like one big hunter-gatherer group, it makes it less so.

  • Dynamics of violence

    Sat, 2012-05-19 12:03 -- John Hawks

    This week's Science is a special issue focusing on human conflict. As you might expect, the issue includes an article focusing on Steven Pinker's book, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. The article is by Andrew Lawler, who talked with a number of bioarchaeologists who focus on violence and warfare in ancient societies [1].

    Pinker blames what he calls “anthropologists of peace” for distorting the record on small-scale group violence. “The classic ‘gentle people’”—the Semang of the Malay peninsula, !Kung in Africa, and Central Arctic Inuit—“turned out to have higher homicide rates than those of American cities,” Pinker says. He criticizes what he calls a single-minded determination “to make hunter-gatherers seem as peaceful as possible.”

    Such charges puzzle some biological anthropologists and archaeologists—the kinds of scholars who gather the type of data used in this debate. They do not argue for a Rousseauian perspective. But that doesn't mean they're ready to embrace a Hobbesian view, either. They find the data too weak to support such sweeping claims and add that the statistical averaging done by Pinker and Gat erases the enormous variation in small-scale societies. Pinker “misused the bioarchaeological record by selecting a few populations … biased toward supporting his argument,” complains archaeologist Gwen Robbins Schug of Appalachian State University in Boone, North Carolina.

    My oversimplified view of matters is that Pinker abstracts a single latent variable from the data on violence and aggression: violence appears to decrease as social complexity and hierarchy increase. The anthropologists here are arguing for a more complex, and possibly cyclical, relationship in which other factors besides social complexity are important. George Milner's example:

    He cites the example of the Hopewell culture of the 1st through 5th centuries C.E. in eastern North America, which appears to have been “socially permeable,” allowing traders to safely transport obsidian from sources in what is today Wyoming as far east as Ohio. Such ease of movement would have been unthinkable before and after that era, when violence between groups was more common. The interesting question, Milner says, is what changed. “To see this from a solely Hobbesian viewpoint misses the real story,” he adds. “We want to know why people switch from peace to war and back again.”

    Rousseau was wrong. The Pleistocene was never a peaceful state of nature.

    Hobbes is too simplistic. Violence in human societies is multidimensional and we perceive it differently depending on its cultural motivation. This is why every discussion of Pinker's thesis (including Lawler's) begins by acknowledging the industrial-scale warfare and mass killing of the 20th century. Such events mean something different than big-city crime. Pinker's generalization is correct, but why it is correct depends on how the social uses of violence have changed over time. Hunter-gatherer groups often used violence, in ways that varied among groups and across time to maintain sometimes-elaborate systems of social control. Pinker's generalization is incomplete, and its incompleteness may be explained by the multidimensionality of violence in human societies.


    References

    1. Lawler A. The Battle Over Violence. Science. 2012;336(6083):829 - 830.
  • How interestiaaang

    Mon, 2012-02-27 21:19 -- John Hawks

    The Science NY Times covers the "vocal fry" trend in an article on how young women are the leading edge of linguistic change.

    But “language changes very fast,” said Dr. Eckert of Stanford, and most people — particularly adults — who try to divine the meaning of new forms used by young women are “almost sure to get it wrong.”

    “What may sound excessively ‘girly’ to me may sound smart, authoritative and strong to my students,” she said.

    I love how what conveyed the authority of upper class British men a generation ago is now the way for some young women to show they are beyond caring about it all. I put on quite a show for my Anthropology 105 students today displaying the au courant usage.

  • Spurring the growth of cities

    Fri, 2012-02-17 11:34 -- John Hawks

    Science this week has a news feature by Andrew Lawler on excavations in southern Mesopotamia looking into what may be the earliest urban developments: "Uncovering Civilization's Roots" (paywall).

    The riddle confronting University of Warsaw scientist Bielinski is part of an ambitious attempt to explain how humans made the momentous leap from village life to urban sprawl. That transformation first happened in Mesopotamia sometime during the 4th millennium B.C.E. in what archaeologists call the Uruk phase, named after a southern Iraq metropolis some 300 kilometers north of Bahra. But recent excavations in Kuwait, Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia provide mounting evidence that the origin of the urban revolution is to be found in the prior era, called the Ubaid, which began around 5500 B.C.E and lasted until about 4000 B.C.E. (see timeline, p. 792). Piecing together how and where that mysterious culture began, spread, and evolved “is a particularly hot topic right now,” says Harvard University archaeologist Jason Ur. Adds University of Chicago archaeologist Gil Stein: “This is the earliest complex society in the world. If you want to understand the roots of the urban revolution, you have to look at the Ubaid.”

    There is much discussion in the article about migration versus in situ cultural intensification as triggers for urbanization. I think today it is misleading to present these mechanisms as opposed to each other. Interactions among populations were likely necessary for intensification of settlements, at the same time we know from genetics that large-scale migrations were happening in early agricultural populations.

    It will be fruitful to consider how migration both introduces external change into a society but also how it spurs internal changes. I don't think that early civilizations are unique in this regard and so we should turn to a diversity of models to understand the dynamics.

  • Developing the sharing sense

    Mon, 2011-03-21 01:11 -- John Hawks

    Following on after yesterday's post about hunter-gatherer population structure, I ended with the proposal that cooperation may be a "cognitive technology" in the same way suggested for numbers ("Number as cognitive technology").

    The technology perspective attracts me. It seems a productive way to examine the interaction between innate and extrinsic factors leading to human behaviors. We learn about numbers. Without a development of the brain within a cultural setting with widespread counting and training in number use, people don't develop the habits of mind that allow rapid comparison of cardinal values. They can still operate on sets of objects and compare their quantities, but they are missing a shorthand, a symbolic shortcut, that comes with learning and practice. Numerical concepts, invented and repeatedly used by human societies, give learners access to this symbolic method of problem-solving.

    Cooperation and other prosocial behaviors are similar in some respects. Whether you share with another person or not in a particular concept depends on the rules about sharing that you learned as a member of your society. What's interesting is that these rules change with age in various ways. So I went looking in the developmental psychology literature for some data about how kids share. My notes here are just a start -- and I'm pretty sure they're rough to read near the end -- but I found it interesting how the data seem to illuminate the issue of cooperation in the archaeological record.

    Toddlers

    Toddlers can, in some circumstances, exhibit a surprising degree of understanding about the intentions of others. They can also be surprisingly helpful -- that is, they can see when another individual wants something, and can actively help that other person to get it. A paper last fall by Kristen Dunfield and colleagues [1] gives a nice review of this kind of helping behavior in toddlers aged 18 and 24 months.

    Replicating previous work by Warneken and Tomasello (2006, 2007), we found that by 18 months, infants are beginning to identify the situations in which helping behavior is required; that is, they will aid instrumentally by retrieving an item that is out of a person’s reach, thus fulfilling another’s unmet goal. Further, the present study found a similar frequency of helping behavior to Warneken and Tomasello (2006), even though in the current study participants only received one experimental helping trial as opposed to the three trials they received in the previous paradigm. In light of previous studies, helping behavior may also be seen as young as 14 months, though the contexts in which it occurs are less flexible, owing perhaps to an emerging understanding of goal-directed activities (Warneken & Tomasello, 2007), recognition of the means by which certain unmet goals can be fulfilled, and the physical ability to mediate the completion of the goal.

    However, as I well remember from my own toddlers, the "prosocial" characteristics of infants can be temperamental, to say the least. Dunsfield and colleagues considered 18 and 24-month-olds, finding substantial heterogeneity among individuals in the kind of helping or sharing behavior they exhibited.

    While acknowledging the dangers of arguing from a null effect, it is the case that although the majority of the participants engaged in at least some prosocial behavior, there were no correlations between the various prosocial behaviors. Further, the most common pattern of response was to engage in only one type of prosocial behavior (helping or sharing). Although the tendency to engage in prosocial behavior in general tended to increase across our two timepoints, the increase was not the result of systematic development within or between the various subtypes of prosocial behavior. Thus, we have no evidence in the present study for “across the board” prosocial behavior within individuals in these two age groups. With future research that explores the consistency both within and between the multiple specific types of behavior, and that considers enduring behavior over time in a longitudinal manner (Eisenberg et al., 1999), it may be the case that helping, comforting, and sharing do not cluster together within an individual’s repertoire and perhaps should not be grouped together as one general category of unified behavior in infancy.

    A natural question is, what does it take to manage any kind of sharing at all among children this young? By this age most children have experienced thousands of times when an adult or another caregiver has performed the opposite role, giving the child what she cannot reach herself. This long history of positive exemplars for sharing and cooperative behavior nevertheless leaves substantial variation among children in how they actually behave in a similar context.

    The first article by Warneken and Tomasello cited above [2] compared human children with chimpanzee juveniles of a similar age. They showed that the human children did show these prosocial tendencies by 18 months, but that so do chimpanzees -- at least to a certain extent. The chimpanzee juveniles handled the most indexical of the tasks relatively well -- the case where a person is reaching for something but needs help to reach it. Other tasks didn't bring out the cooperative nature in chimpanzee juveniles:

    However, the chimpanzees did not help the human reliably in the other types of tasks—that is, in those involving physical obstacles, wrong results, or wrong means. In a follow-up study, we gave them two additional tasks of these types—designed to make the human's problem especially salient and with more time for a response—and they still did not help in these tasks (14). Presumably, when someone is reaching with an outstretched arm toward an object, the goal is in principle easier to understand and the kind of intervention follows straightforwardly. This could explain why out-of-reach tasks (in contrast to the other scenarios) elicited more helping by children and the only instances of helping by chimpanzees. Children and chimpanzees are both willing to help, but they appear to differ in their ability to interpret the other's need for help in different situations.

    This goes some distance toward explaining what children need to make them potential helpers. They need some way of figuring out the goal of the person who needs help, and they need to have no goal of their own that directly conflicts. Before Warneken and Tomasello's work, chimpanzee juveniles had not shown signs of such prosocial behaviors in other experimental contexts. Those authors attribute the difference to food: Most chimpanzee experiments had involved food treats, attempting to get individuals to share food with each other. The chimpanzee's own desire for the food may directly interfere with the goals of other individuals -- a conflict that is hardly likely to lead to sharing, even in human toddlers.

    There is little sense in calling the chimpanzee behavioral pattern "rudimentary", as psychologists sometimes do. The human pattern here is rudimentary compared to the extent of helping and sharing that occur later in childhood. The human children in this context seem to have an ability to diagnose the intentions of another individual more than do the chimpanzees. They also seem to have more patience for helping, in some sense. Warneken and Tomasello returned to the topic in a 2009 review [3] that puts forward the situation with respect to sharing, helping, and information transfer. They note that human language depends on cooperation in a way that chimpanzee vocalizations do not. It may not be coincidental that language is learned across the same ages as cooperative behaviors.

    Preschool-aged children

    Olson and Spelke [4] reported on a slightly more intricate study with 3.5-year-old children. They assessed sharing behavior in which children had to divide a pool of items among a number of recipients. These potential recipients sometimes included both relatives and strangers. In other instances, the potential recipients varied in terms of whether they had interacted with the children by sharing with them. Olson and Spelke intended to find whether children of this age would engage in direct and indirect reciprocity, and whether they would skew their distribution of the resource toward relatives as opposed to strangers.

    What they found is that kids of this age typically divy things up fairly:

    Children may have distributed resources equally on the four-resource trials for either of two reasons. First, it is possible that children will resort to equal sharing whenever resources are plentiful and will favor family, friends, reciprocators, and generous others only under conditions of scarcity. Such a possibility is consistent with the finding that social conflicts among older children and adults arise primarily when resources are limited ([Jackson, 1993] and [Sherif et al., 1961]). Alternatively, the equality response may be driven by a predisposition to distribute resources in a one-to-one correspondence with recipients whenever such a distribution is possible. That predisposition, in turn, could arise either spontaneously or through the internalization of an explicit rule children are taught by parents and other adults.

    As soon as they can manage matching objects with people, they are parceling out things one to a person. That's obviously an integral part of most children's experience -- everything from passing out parts in a game, to passing out food at dinner. So the behavior itself is highly reinforced if not explicitly taught, and it may well be explicitly taught to most children.

    The children in Olson and Spelke's trials also tended to share more with people who had previously been generous in the past, either directly or indirectly to the child. By rewarding past generosity, the children were fulfilling their end of a reciprocity arrangement. This seems pretty relevant to the dynamics in ancient human groups; if a 3-year-old can manage the basics of reciprocity, it may not have taken much to push people into a stable hunting and gathering economy, which is based on reciprocity.

    School-age children

    Here's what interested me the most. Kids at 3.5 years already get the idea of sharing equally and fairly. So you might think this would be deeply ingrained in older children. But instead what we see is that older children start to reason more and more like adults, which ironically makes them share less evenly. They just get more clever about how to rationalize their choice to be unfair.

    For example, a nice study by Gummerum and colleagues [5] compared students age 9 to age 17 for their performance in the "dictator game."

    The "dictator game" is an experimental model that has been repeatedly employed in adults to study the themes of cooperation and altruism. An individual is given control over how to divide a single sum between herself and another anonymous person. The individual can choose any division down all for himself and zero for the anonymous player.

    Gummerum and colleagues added a twist, making individuals work in groups of three to decide on their offers. The offers then reflected not only the preferences of individuals going into the study but also their moral reasoning with each other after discussing the offers in small groups. This yielded an interesting, almost ethnographic picture of how the children came to make their decisions about appropriate offers.

    They found that the offers made by groups were strongly influenced by the level of moral reasoning employed by group members. When a student who favored a low offer was arguing at a higher level of sophistication, the group was more likely to adopt a low offer. And vice-versa -- when the clever student was arguing for a more equitable offer at a higher level, the group was more likely to give more. Girls gave higher offers than boys in the experiment as well.

    In a game like this, the sharing and reciprocity aspects of prosocial behavior are transformed into moral questions. No punishment befalls students who choose to make low offers in the dictator game; yet there is the consideration of self-regard. And others have heard the arguments that a student makes, affecting her reputation. Moral reasoning is, in other words, public.

    Concluding thoughts

    What I find so interesting about comparing children of different ages, is not about cooperation but instead about how the rules are shifted to higher levels of description. Sharing and reciprocity are quite simple, and children can manage them young, although irregularly. Kids can learn about sharing and helping in a rather unsophisticated way, and their performance reflects very simple expectations. Equal division, turn-taking, and punishment of defectors are all integral parts of early childhood.

    Obviously, any humans living in foraging societies in the recent past have grappled similarly with the moral aspects of cooperation and altruism. But that moral reasoning comes at an age far past when children are taught about the importance of fairness, sharing and helping. The kind of dynamic that concerns many anthropologists -- how do foraging peoples maintain the rules that underlie reciprocity and altruistic behavior -- is simply at a different level than the dynamic that actually inculcates cooperation. Yet with children who learn systematically to help and cooperate, such behaviors have a much higher chance of existing stably, even in small societies. If there is any cognitive invention that a human society would not want to lose, I think some conception of fairness may be it.


    References

  • Hunter-gatherer kinship and band composition

    Sun, 2011-03-20 00:18 -- John Hawks

    Kim Hill and colleagues described in last week's Science a study of kinship within bands of hunter-gatherers known from ethnographic research [1]. They couched their study to dispute the idea that most of the members of hunter-gatherer bands are kin.

    Why? Because the idea that hunter-gatherers live in bands composed mainly of close kin has been a very common answer to the question, "Why do humans cooperate?"

    Traditionally, anthropologists have suggested that hunter-gatherer co-residence is almost entirely based on kinship [e.g., (15, 16)], and evolutionary psychologists have embraced this idea in order to develop “mismatch hypotheses” about cooperation among non-kin in modern societies (17). Evolutionary researchers have also argued both that female philopatry and maternal grandmother provisioning is ancestral (5) and that male philopatry, typical of other African hominoids (18, 19) and leading to adult male provisioning (8), is the ancestral human pattern. If either of these is correct, and if foraging bands are mainly collections of close kin, inclusive fitness gains might be the primary motivator of ancestral human cooperation.

    True, many evolutionary psychologists have adopted this view with gusto: Hunter-gatherers cooperate because they live in small bands with their kin. But as many have realized, actual bands of hunter-gatherers pretty quickly show that this isn't true. Either men or women generally move when they marry, so bands have close relatives in them, but they also have unrelated individuals. In practice people often move with a sibling, or their adult parents may come to live with them as well (both practices described by Hill and colleagues).

    The net effect of residence changes is to reduce the levels of inbreeding within bands, and also reduce the genetic variation among bands. Some evolutionary psychologists occupy themselves with group selection precisely because the relevant level of cooperation in hunter-gatherers is the band, and bands include many people who are distantly if at all related. But (as Hill and colleagues also note) the high rates of intermarriage among bands greatly reduces the strength of group selection possible among them.

    I think the paper sets up a straw man when it claims that the "traditional view" in anthropology is that bands are made up of kin. That's certainly not the view I learned. Their "traditional" citations are Elmer Service and June Helm, writing in the 1960's, and I don't doubt that they and others have argued for kin-structured co-residence. My understanding of "kin-structured" was never that bands were made up of close kin, but instead that residence was determined by kinship pattern. Exogamy is driven by the incest taboo, for example. Whether men or women typically change residence to marry depends on other kinship rules. Humans recognize kin, and their movements are not incidental to this, resulting in a kin-structured society. Some rules force people to live in different groups from their close kin, not the same groups.

    At any rate, Hill and colleagues confirm that the groups in their dataset do not have bands composed mainly of close kin. They suggest that we need a new theory of human social evolution to explain the emergence of cooperative behaviors:

    The hunter-gatherer social structure we describe has important implications for theories about the evolution of cooperation and cultural capacity. First, bands are mainly composed of individuals either distantly related by kinship and/or marriage or unrelated altogether. In our sample of 32 societies, primary kin generally make up less than 10% of a residential band. For example, in the Ache we estimate the mean genetic coefficient of relatedness (Hamilton’s r) between adults in 58 precontact bands to be only 0.054 (n = 19,634 dyads, SE = 0.0001). This agrees with Ache informants who reported that during the precontact period they often lived with people described as “friends, not relatives.” The Ju/’hoansi results in Fig. 2 suggest that mean relatedness in other groups is not too different from the Ache. Thus, we cannot necessarily assume that cognitive features such as inequality aversion and enhanced prosocial emotions evolved in ancestral environments composed mainly of close kin. Given the constant flow of individuals between groups, genetic group selection at the level of the band also seems improbable. Instead, cultural group selection (27) may lead to the spread of cooperative institutions within ethnic groups, which might then create a context favoring the genetic evolution of prosocial cognitive mechanisms through individual-level selection.

    I have two reactions. The paper is missing a null model. It is true that the hunter-gatherers are much less related to each other within a band than would be predicted if they were choosing to live near close kin. But are they more related to each other than would be the case if they moved randomly? What if individuals move around without consideration of kinship at all, according to a simple distance function? If individuals behave as they would without any knowledge of kinship, it's clear that our explanation for cooperation needs to work at the individual level. Cultural group selection may help explain the persistence of institutions and rules, but I think it's insufficient to explain the evolution of people who can form institutions and rules.

    My second reaction is that humans are self-interested. In my experience, children learn to share when they can grasp the concept of reciprocity. Let me suggest that, like numbers, cooperation may be a cognitive technology in humans. We may have many biological changes that facilitate cooperation -- for example, I would look for human-specific changes to oxytocin regulation. But those changes may be mostly tuning a system to facilitate prosocial behavior (and reduce aggression). They don't explain the occurrence of specific prosocial behaviors, because those behaviors themselves did not evolve. They were invented.


    References

  • Neandertal band of brothers

    Tue, 2010-12-21 11:48 -- John Hawks

    Carles Lalueza-Fox and colleagues [1] have a new analysis of the mitochondrial DNA from El Sidrón, Spain. The site has a minimum number of 12 Neandertal specimens, dating to 49,000 years ago. The authors recovered mtDNA from all of the skeletal individuals, and additionally tested for the presence of Y chromosome to diagnose sex.

    They found that all the adult males in the sample are close maternal relatives -- that is, they all share a single mtDNA haplotype. In contrast, the adult females and juveniles have a range of different haplotypes. Using some conclusions about the archaeological context (discussed below), they interpret the 12 individuals as part (possibly all) of a kin-structured group. They note that the relationships are then consistent with a patrilocal residence pattern: The men in the group are linked by kinship, the women have come from other kin networks, possibly transferred from other groups.

    In the last paragraph of the paper, the authors suggest a further conclusion about life history:

    Based on the ages of the El Sidrón group members and their mtDNA lineages, we speculate that juvenile 2 is the offspring (or close matrilineal relative) of female adult 5 and that juvenile 1 and the infant are the offspring of female adult 4. If correct, the latter relationship would indicate an interbirth interval of around 3 y for Neandertals. This period fits with the average 3-4-y interbirth interval reported for several modern hunter-gatherer groups (19).

    That conclusion would be based on a single birth interval. It depends on the assumption that these juveniles are in fact siblings, which further depends on the proposed site deposition scenario. So although it is consistent with the data, I think it is very weak evidence. Still, it's a lot more evidence that I expected to have anytime soon. Moreover, it seems to me that the birth interval is testable with reference to dental development. A 3-4 year birth interval implies weaning in or before the fourth year of life, which ought to be reflected in enamel formation.

    Awesome! We can now test hypotheses about Neandertal social organization directly from DNA evidence. The authors' hypothesis about patrilocality is consistent with the mtDNA, and I think it is likely to be the correct one.

    Still, we have many reasons to be cautious about the interpretation. For one thing, Neandertals are already known to be relatively low in mtDNA variation, with very little regional population structure in the mtDNA. In such a population, it wouldn't be surprising to find individuals sharing the same mtDNA haplotype, even if they were not close kin. It might seem surprising that the individuals sharing the mtDNA haplotype are all men, but with a sample of only 12 individuals, that coincidence isn't really all that unlikely. The limited mtDNA variation would then be a sign of inbreeding at a regional level, not necessarily the kin structure of a particular group at a particular time.

    Placing those individuals together as part of the same group is a forensic challenge. For most bones at archaeological sites, we would assume that the individuals lived at different times, possibly hundreds or thousands of years apart. The interpretation that they represent a single group requires several assumptions about the deposition of the remains, which amount to a detailed and surprising scenario. Lalueza-Fox and colleagues describe the El Sidrón skeletal assemblage as a result of systematic cannibalism:

    The excavations to date have yielded > 1,800 hominin skeletal fragments and ∼400 Mousterian stone tools made in situ (3), but faunal remains are very scarce. The Neandertal bones are in a secondary position, and the original deposit, worn out by erosion, is thought to have been placed either on the surface or in an upper karst level (2). The present assemblage occurred shortly after the death of the individuals by the collapse of an upper gallery into the Ossuary Gallery triggered by a natural event, probably a violent storm that also dragged down pebbles and clay (Fig. S1). Given that (i) ≈18% of the lithic industry can be refitted, and (ii) the widespread spatial distribution of these refitted artifacts, it may be surmised that they result from a single and brief cultural activity. This likelihood lends even more support to the synchrony of the whole assemblage (2, 3), dating to around 49,000 y ago (4). Some evidence, such as skeletal parts still in anatomical articulation, indicates little site disturbance since formation. Ex hypothesis, the fact that all types of skeletal remains show evidence of anthropic activities associated to cannibalism (2) could indicate that the assemblage corresponds to a Neandertal group processed by other Neandertals on the surface. Although it is impossible to be sure that the individuals represent a contemporaneous group, alternative explanations, such as recurrent accumulation over time of cannibalized individuals that were closely related through the female line, seem less plausible.

    If this interpretation is correct, it would be the most stunning example of intergroup violence known from the Pleistocene. Imagine the circumstance in which a group of hunter-gatherers would kill and butcher 12 individuals in one paroxysm of aggression. Certainly it was not mere survival, it was warfare.

    Is it true? The problem is the "violent storm". How do we know that the existing assemblage is a good representation of the original deposition site? The high number of refits does imply that we're not looking at a random sample of an originally much larger assemblage, but it's hard to be more definitive. If we have the remains of 12 individuals, how many may have been involved in the act?

    Naturally, if the remains had actually accumulated over a longer time, the conclusions about patrilocality would be unwarranted. In that case we would be back to a more general question of regional or local inbreeding among Neandertals, interesting from the point of view of population structure, but with less concrete information about social organization.

    The forensic case provides a window into behavior that is potentially much broader. Krapina is another site with hundreds of skeletal fragments representing an even larger number of individuals, which may also represent one or more instances of cannibalism. In that case, the debate about cannibalism (versus secondary reburial of defleshed bones) has flared off and on for years. It is just very difficult to attain a reasonable certainty about such behaviors from the archaeological and skeletal evidence at hand.

    I will be interested to read more about the context at El Sidrón as the research continues. The issues of kinship can be easily settled with nuclear DNA sequencing, and should in fact lead to some extremely interesting science, if that can be accomplished. The authors list some of the barriers to such sequencing, given a relatively low DNA yield in many of the specimens, but the field has rapidly progressed. Meanwhile, the archaeological interpretation of the site may allow us to revisit some other Neandertal assemblages, looking for other signs of aggression, violence, and social organization.


    References

    Synopsis: 
    Analysis of mtDNA from El Sidron cave shows relationships among the males, presumed to be an ancient group.
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