john hawks weblog

paleoanthropology, genetics and evolution

paleoclimate

  • Climate reconstruction and human evolution, 2: Tracking climate change

    Wed, 2010-01-06 22:50 -- John Hawks

    I am examining the pathways that climate might have influenced human evolution, and as I wrote earlier, I'm focusing first on the issue of relatively short-term climate fluctuations. How could submillennial-scale climate variability plausibly impose selection on human populations? I can think of two mechanisms:

    1. Climatic zones might shift rapidly across geographic space, meaning that humans and their prey species must constantly move to track suitable habitat. Movement and periodic habitat contraction tends to increase competition; it also favors traits that expand habitat tolerance.

    2. Global climate fluctuations might decrease the spatial autocorrelation of climate and geography. In essence, local environments become less stable, so that species fine-tuned to local habitats have lower fitness. Greater habitat tolerance is favored.

    In both cases I wrote "might", because even though global climate changes had a high amplitude during the Pleistocene, only the local consequences of those changes would have mattered to human populations. It is a matter of conjecture that those local consequences were (a) of greater amplitude or rapidity than, say, Pliocene climate changes, and (b) large compared to the ordinary year-to-year fluctuation of local environments.

    Submillennial Pleistocene climate changes could well have had large effects on the climate of Africa (or Asia, or Europe), and yet those effects might still have been minor compared to the ordinary variation. That is the effect claimed for the last 100 years, where the global temperature trend is large, but the ordinary year-to-year variability is much larger.

    How fast does the gradient move?

    Conservation biologists are very worried about climate change over the next few hundred years. Human land use has shrunk the geographic ranges of most land species. Many are now limited to small fragments of habitat, sometimes protected by governments in national parks and reserves, sometimes not. Any population that consists of a very small number of individuals is in danger of extinction, both due to casastrophes like disease and fire, or due to the intrinsic effects of strong genetic drift -- a so-called "mutational meltdown". Some abundant species are at risk of extinction if a few key habitat fragments should be lost -- the Mexican wintering grounds of monarch butterflies, for instance. If the local climates of these habitat fragments should change, the local biota may shift in ways that compromise the survival of the endangered populations.

    So, there is a lot of interest in modeling how global temperature changes may influence local environments. How will rainfall and temperature patterns in small habitat fragments shift as the global system changes?

    The recent paper by Loarie and colleagues (2009) is a high-profile example. These researchers attempt to identify a "velocity" of climate change as applied to different terrestrial ecosystems. The idea of a velocity rests on the assumption that local environments exist along a temperature and rainfall gradient, such that getting a little warmer or cooler will shift the boundary between adjacent habitats. If so, then one might determine how fast a biotic boundary will move with a given rate of temperature increase. Plug the global world temperature model into this ecogeographic model, and you might work out the velocity of change expected in the near future.

    The result is a range of velocities for different biomes:

    Using temperature change calculated from 2000–2100 under the intermediate A1B emissions scenario, the geometric mean velocity was 0.42 km yr-1 (0.11–1.46). (Throughout, we summarize uncertainty in the mean by listing upper and lower, ± 1 s.d., estimates in parenthesis.) See Supplementary Fig. 17 for other emissions scenarios. We summarize velocity for biomes of the globe and rank them by increasing mean velocity (Fig. 3). Doing so shows that mountainous biomes require the slowest velocities to keep pace with climate change. In contrast, flatter biomes such as flooded grasslands, mangroves and deserts require much greater velocities.

    Using these projections, Loarie and colleagues focused on a very specific question. Consider small protected areas where species now find refuge from human habitat disturbance. How long does it take one of these habitat isoclines to traverse the length of such a refuge?

    To explore the interaction between protected area sizes and velocities required to keep pace with climate change, we calculated residence times, defined as the diameter of each protected area divided by velocity (km/km yr-1 = yr). Assuming that protected areas are circular and disconnected, this index can be interpreted as the time for current climate to cross a protected area. Such residence times exceed 100 years for only 8.02% (2.67–16.49) of protected areas.

    This is a kind of modeling that I approach with heightened skepticism. Remember the "Bigfoot biogeography" paper from this summer? The ecogeographic models will accept any data and spit out an answer. The input data in this case come from a climate model, with its own intrinsic error. The ecogeographic data have additional observation/classification error and variance. Those errors add up.

    One thing working in favor of their conclusion is that the northward (and upward) extension of the range of tree species did progress around 1 km/year in many parts of the Northern Hemisphere. They point this out in their discussion, and it brings to mind a couple of very interesting historical examples in evolutionary biology, that I'll have to review another time.

    How would this mode of change affect Pleistocene humans?

    Right now, though, I just want to tackle a more limited question: Would this "velocity" of habitat change really have been any challenge for Pleistocene humans?

    Historic hunter-gatherers were generally very mobile people. Most of them maintained large home ranges and lived at relatively low population densities, under 4 people per square kilometer. In northern habitats, their density was substantially lower, down to as low as 1 person per 100 square kilometers. There are lots of reasons to doubt that Pleistocene hunter-gatherers could have survived in the high-latitude grassland and tundra, places where people lived recently only with sophisticated logistical strategies, at very low densities. Loarie and colleagues mention high-latitude, low-topography regions as those predicted to have high velocities of biotic change. The temperate ecologies, on the other hand, have very broad distributions of predicted velocities, with a mean around the global average, 0.4 km/year.

    That adds up to around 10 km per human generation, which is, give or take, the diameter of a large home range for a hunter-gatherer band. If Pleistocene climates shifted with velocities like those predicted for the near future, a value of 10 km/generation would imply that home ranges at the edge of a habitat regime would be at risk of disappearing (or at least, substantially changing in resources) on a human timescale.

    Moving to track climate would be very easily within human capabilities. These kinds of velocities are orders of magnitude smaller than those maintained by people during long-distance migrations. If we imagine a kind of Brownian motion of individuals within the matrix of hunter-gatherer groups, any one individual probably had a larger residence shift during her lifetime than would be necessary to keep up with the secular climate trend. If we assume that people couldn't move into their neighbors' home ranges, then the worst effect of this kind of secular climate change would be forcing them to adjust to the resources that exist 10 km away. Not so terrible-sounding.

    But maybe the direct effects of climate change were not the important factor. Resource stress in a linear swath of hunter-gatherer groups might have increased social frictions, intensifying the competition for more stable parts of the preferred habitat. If, as I think likely, human groups were embedded in a source-sink metapopulation, climate change would likely have increased the fraction of long-term sink habitat. A nice-looking home range at the edge of a favored habitat would be at high risk of shifting to a different habitat type on the timescale of a few hundred years. Eventually, climate oscillation would return this edge of the range, but possibly at the cost of area on the opposite edge.

    Such changes would not be fatal to human populations -- after all, people moved much farther. But speaking on the scale of generations, people may have tracked habitat mainly by reproducing more in favorable regions, deciding the issue by reproduction instead of migration. If so, climate change would have reduced effective population size to some extent. How much? Depends on the granularity and sizes of long-term favorable ranges, and the intensity of territory defense by Pleistocene groups.

    UPDATE (2010-01-07): For threatened species today, the question of year-to-year variation may be less critical. We assume they are already adapted to year-to-year climate fluctuation, otherwise they'd be dead already. The species that make up their habitat need to have survived that year-to-year fluctuation also. The secular trend increases the number of bad years and makes them on average slightly worse, which may stress some resident species beyond the point they can survive. All this is much worse if genetic variation is already low -- then every stochastic fluctuation in population size becomes a chance of extinction.

    For Pleistocene humans, adaptation to the year-to-year variation can't be assumed constant. The extinction of particular groups over a 100-year span is only relevant to our evolution if there was differential survival determined in part by some heritable traits. One way to adapt to year-to-year climate fluctuation is to broaden the resource base -- which is also a good strategy to deal with long-term secular trends in climate. But the very ability to broaden resource dependence will tend to reduce demographic stress during bad years.

    In other words, I don't see how these kinds of climate fluctuations are going to lead to runaway or autocatalytic selection. The system seems to have a built-in buffer, at least on the timescale of a few generations.

    References:

    Loarie SR, Duffy PB, Hamilton H, Asner GP, Field CB, Ackerly DD. 2009. The velocity of climate change. Nature 462:1052-1055. doi:10.1038/nature08649

  • Climate reconstruction and human evolution, 1

    Wed, 2009-12-16 23:04 -- John Hawks

    I have from time to time written short pieces here about climate fluctuations and their effect on human evolution. This topic was a major theme in the recent Nova miniseries on human origins.

    Some scientists think that human intelligence is an adaptation to rapid climate changes, and that brain size increased during the Pleistocene as a direct result of climate fluctuations. I write, "scientists," because this really is a motley interdisciplinary crew -- archaeologists, geologists, psychologists and some paleoanthropologists in the mix.

    Some others think that humans mainly suffered through climate by means of a few major events, global catastrophes like the Toba eruption. By decimating human populations, these big catastrophes caused all kinds of accidental changes to our biology. Why just today, you can read a story riffing on a Curtis Marean lecture, making it into this: "How shellfish saved the human race." Just one of many speculations about how climate brought humans to near-extinction in the last couple hundred thousand years.

    These two kinds of thinking about paleoclimate and human evolution are not mutually exclusive, and many people kind of lump them together. Both kinds of arguments depend on models linking fitness, plasticity, and paleoclimate. They also depend on the amplitude of ancient climate change episodes and the relation between this amplitude and the geographic variation in climate known to have been tolerated by ancient humans. Genetic modeling and paleoclimate modeling, working together.

    That's the way that testable science ought to work. But so far, proponents of these ideas have proposed only verbal arguments without any modeling or math at all. Without the numbers, I don't see any reason to believe that climate specifically affected the evolution of human behavior. Is it bunk? I'd like to know at least if any of it is falsifiable.

    I'm going to review some literature in both areas during the next few weeks. I'm reasonably familiar with the literature on selection and plasticity, and it gives me a lot of skepticism about the prospects of explaining human intelligence as a function of climate variability. But I'm less familiar with the paleoclimate literature. Maybe hypotheses about climate forcing in human evolution are untestable -- but to arrive at this conclusion both the genetic and paleoclimate aspects need a realistic assessment.

    Submillennial-scale variability

    How can we start to understand the role of climate variability on Pleistocene human evolution? I'm going to begin with the topic of submillennial-scale climate fluctuations. The global climate fluctuates from year to year, from decade to decade, across centuries, and on much longer scales -- up to the 100,000-year duration of Pleistocene glacial episodes.

    The longest climate cycles are relatively simple -- the paleoanthropological record is just good enough that we might be able to find associations between skeletal evolution, archaeological presence and the major glacials. These very large-scale temporal effects are not my immediate interest, but they will be worth considering very closely. Did the earliest habitation of Europe depend on climatic goodwill? To what extent were humans driven south out of Northern Europe by the last glaciation? What effects did periodic isolation from the Asian mainland have on Pleistocene Javan populations? Those are questions that implicate the largest-scale climate cycles, and I think they may be to a great extent answerable.

    They are not, however, the kind of effects argued to have induced a consistent selection pressure on intelligence. Nor do they suggest a global bottleneck due to climate instability.

    A sustained selection pressure would require climate instability on a shorter timescale -- measured in maybe tens of human generations or less, not thousands. This scale is submillennial at most, and possibly decadal.

    The reconstruction of paleoclimate on these shorter timescales has become feasible during the last ten to fifteen years. For the last few millennia, tree ring records provide evidence about climate variation -- sometimes at annual intervals, sometimes time-averaged over five or ten year spans. Lake sediments sometimes preserve a record of climate variability, in the thickness or composition of layers laid down over time. Sea floor sediments also can inform about ancient climate, principally because windblown (or waterborne) sediments reflect continental aridity. Ice cores from glaciers and ice sheets also provide a record for reconstruction atmospheric temperatures and precipitation over some regions -- and in the exceptional cases of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets, climate reconstruction may be possible back to as far as 800,000 years ago.

    But these records are not direct indicators of ancient temperature or precipitation; they are proxies. Each of them is localized in a particular place with its own unique regional deviations from the global mean. During the Pleistocene, the places were people lived were pretty far away from most of the available proxy records. There are exceptions, like the Nile delta sapropels and African lake sediments, which I'll discuss in some detail. But for the most part, our question is whether proxy records can test hypotheses about regional climate variability in the regions occupied by humans.

    The same question arises in the context of recent climate change. We have several proxy records for temperature and precipitation during the last 1000 years, and we want to accurately reconstruct global mean temperature means and variability. The question was broached in a 2009 editorial essay by Hughes and Ammann, as follows:

    The last millennium paleoclimate reconstruction (PR) challenge Given the suite of uncertainties and limitations connected to proxy and short instrumental data, it is very difficult to derive a reconstruction method that is capable of explicitly dealing with all issues, and thus some compromises must, inevitably, be made. At the same time, many existing methods might be reasonably well suited to study particular aspects of past variability and change (Ammann and Wahl 2007). However, we do not have a solid quantitative understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of each method. When different methods are applied to the same time period and spatial domain, how different are their results and inherent uncertainties, and to what is each method particularly sensitive? Differences could result from limitations in the included proxy climate records’ ability to record climate across different time scales; the sampling distribution (network); or possibly the method itself or its underlying assumptions. To assess the influence of all these uncertainties, the last millennium paleoclimate reconstruction (PR) challenge is being developed to offer an experimental test bed for systematically gauging the ability of the various methods to recover the true underlying climate. The climate data are drawn from output of fully coupled climate system models that provide geophysically realistic spatiotemporal variations across various climate fields. Thus the target of reconstructions will be fully known. ... The key question, ultimately, is to find out how well the suite of reconstruction methods, if applied to a realistic set of pseudo-proxy data, are able to reproduce the underlying climate, not knowing the actual target climate (achieved in a double-blind approach) (Hughes and Ammann 2008:256-257).

    In other words, even considering the last 1000 years with its abundance of proxy data, the climate models are not yet capable of replicating regional variability or time-series variance of temperature records with high fidelity. I'll add (from elsewhere in the editorial) that the general question of the magnitude and duration of external forcing of climate (say, fluctuations in solar output) are also not well integrated.

    The last 1000 years (and more broadly, the Holocene) has sometimes been described as relatively stable compared to the higher-amplitude climate fluctuations of the Late Pleistocene. In that light, the prospects seem poor that we could accurately assess the regional effects of Pleistocene climate instability, using many fewer proxies than are available for the last 1000 years.

    But for particular times and places, the situation may be better. Also, the general concept of global climate instability may itself allow us to work with genetic models, if we only knew the likely amplitude and periodicity of changes. So I'll be reading further into the climate variation of the last 1000 years and how it may have been different in the Pleistocene.

    Meanwhile, the Hughes and Ammann editorial is interesting in several sections, as the authors discuss possible methods for increasing the fidelity of climate models as applied to paleoclimate data. I was following up on the literature citing one of these methods when I found the essay. On this, I'll just add that the statistical methods for dealing with time series of temperature proxies are tricky. Some methods may raise the prediction value of a proxy in different regions, while decreasing the appearance of yearly or decadal-scale variation in the global mean. So one must be careful about the choice of statistics when assessing paleoclimate variability.

    References:

    Hughes MK, Ammann CM. 2009. The future of the past -- an earth system framework for high resolution paleoclimatology: editorial essay. Climatic Change 94:247-259. doi:10.1007/s10584-009-9588-0

  • NOVA: Becoming Human

    Tue, 2009-11-03 22:17 -- John Hawks

    OK, I'm going to live-blog this show. I've been looking forward to it for a while -- I loved the old NOVA series with Don Johanson and have often showed it in classes but I had to stop several years ago because it's getting out of date. These are great overview-type programs, unlike the more special-purpose one-topic shows.

    The producers gave me the opportunity to review the program's script a few months ago (that's explains the acknowledgement at the end), so I'm not expecting any unpleasant surprises.

    The pre-credits opening: Naked people smiling. Naked chimps grooming...

    7:01: "What set us on the path to humanity? The questions are huge, but at last, there are answers..."

    "For millions of years, many human-like species coexisted on our planet, until one day, there was only us."

    7:03: "Apes that had walked on four legs stood up and walked on two." We see apish CGI hominins. Then, to the Sahara to see Toumaï. Michel Brunet is describing the skull.

    "We, Homo sapiens, are the first ever to be alone."

    7:06: To the Afar, explaining the Rift Valley and its erosive contexts. The Insta-Zoom effect across the desert is actually kind of cool. We see Zeresenay Alemseged driving an SUV, then walking in badlands with scattered bones. Nice photographs of the Dikika skull in context.

    7:09: Zooming backward into a timeline, as if the years are sucking us back, the program explains the timespan of human evolution as a series of doublings backward in time.

    7:10: Alemseged is in the National Museum of Ethiopia, preparing the skull. It's a nice video treatment, shoing the slow preparing with dental drill. The long shots of the postcranial elements are very illustrative -- this is a good demonstration of how the anatomy informs us about the developmental schedule and lifeways.

    7:13: Don Johanson is explaining how he found AL 129-1. Then, he explains the difference between the chimpanzee and human pelvis. Too bad they couldn't have included Ardipithecus; it would be interesting.... I'm really liking the fact that you have people interacting with actual casts instead of lots of CGI images. You have a much better impression of the scale

    7:15: Now the scene moves to Kenya, this is going to be about paleoenvironments. Yannic Garcin and Daniel Melnick are describing how the now-desert landscape was once much wetter. We go back to the Afar, with Alemseged explaining the fauna that's just eroding up out of the ground (wonder how set up that scene was...).

    7:18: Bipedalism. It's like Saturday Night Fevur. Brian Richmond appears to explain theories about why bipedality was adaptive. This is all accompanied by contemporary dancers wiggling around. Chimpanzee-like ancestors are illustrated with video of actual chimpanzees (wonder what Lovejoy is thinking...). Dan Lieberman is talking about energy budgets. People and chimps on treadmills hooked up to oxygen meters.

    7:22: Mark Stoneking explains the molecular clock. "The dates that one almost always gets are 5 to 7 million years ago for when humans and chimpanzees shared a common ancestor."

    7:24: We go to Chad. Brunet explaining why they needed to recover fossils from somewhere other than East Africa. "Everyone said 'no', there just aren't any [human-like] fossils there."

    7:26: "There were no bones apart from the skull..." Er...

    7:27: The skull is reconstructed with a CT scanner and then cast. Oops...the rest of the shots of casts are all taken directly from the skull, not the 3-d scan version. Nice artist's rendering of Toumaï here.

    7:30: I'd hate to be one of the dancers walking by on the screen with the voiceover, "Walking upright didn't mean that they had big brains."

    7:33: Brain growth in Selam. Hints of a longer childhood -- of course, at 330 cc, it's almost the size of a full-grown chimpanzee. Todd Preuss is discussing the evolution of the brain, showing us actual pickled brains of human and chimpanzees. Lunate sulcus -- was Selam like a human or a chimpanzee?

    7:35: Ralph Holloway is describing the brain reorganization -- great shot of him with his collection of endocasts. The conclusion is that the lunate sulcus was human-like.

    7:37: Now we have stone tools appearing, Brian Richmond explains how we recognize tools. Unlikely they were made by Australopithecus, because they didn't make them earlier. Skip forward to KNM-ER 1470, "the dawn of a new era, beginning around 2 million years ago." Tools were used for meat processing. Homo habilis was small in body size, but had a much bigger brain than Australopithecus.

    7:41: Viktor Deak is reconstructing Homo habilis. I like it, more apish than the usual rendering.

    7:43: "Africa's gradual drying trend was punctuated by bursts of rapid climate fluctuation." We see Rick Potts explaining the stratigraphy of a lake alternating with desert and volcanic layers over time. The idea of "variability selection" is explained.

    7:45: Analyzing diatoms in layers of rock -- the species tell the alternation of shallow and deep lake levels. It's a record of strong fluctuations. We see rapid clips of three different scientists (Potts, John Kingston, and Mark Maslin) talking about water fluxes. It's a good way of explaining the climate instability -- although they could have gone a bit further: when they mention "Lake Victoria-sized lakes appearing and disappearing", for example, they might have pointed out that Lake Victoria itself has appeared recently.

    7:48: Dust from ocean cores. Once again, it comes down to tiny sea creatures whose anatomy correlates with date.

    7:50: We get a rapid montage reviewing the climate instability idea. Hmmm...I have to say that the very fast cutting of clips and louder music doesn't really add to the credibility of the idea -- it seems like something is being left out.

    7:51: Rick Potts restates the variability selection argument. "Simple but revolutionary idea -- human evolution is nature's experiment with versatility...we are creatures of climate change."

    That's the end. I think the paleoenvironment story was well done. The shots of how this science is done were very illustrative -- from the field to the lab, the program showed the fine layers of sediment and careful study of microscopic creatures.

    On the other hand, the show may have gone a little too far in the "climate made everything happen" direction. I don't think the "variability selection" idea explains the origin of Homo, and while the program did briefly list alternative views about the adaptive value of bipedality, it left no doubt that African desiccation and loss of forest was the ultimate cause.

    I think everything with actual fossils, dirt, or rocks was well done. In particular, we got a good view of most of the Selam skeleton, with the notable exception of the hyoid bone. These are the best available images of the specimen to date. Holloway's descriptions of endocast evolution were well done, placed in the middle of a big table of fossil casts. I like the solidity with which the program showed the fossil record. Hopefully the next two segments will also follow this technique -- much preferred over the CGI-reconstruction technique.

    I will be out of the country for the next two parts of the trilogy, so I'll have to see if I can get them online. The NOVA Evolution website has the first episode online now, so there's some hope.

  • The Younger Dryas impact fizzle?

    Tue, 2009-10-13 00:40 -- John Hawks

    In 2007, R. B. Firestone and colleagues published evidence of an extraterrestrial impact, roughly coincident with the onset of the cold climate event known as the Younger Dryas. This event, around 12,900 years ago, is around about the time of some (but not all) megafaunal extinctions in North America, it is also around the time (but not precisely) of the Clovis culture. The paper argued that the impact event may have "contributed to end-Pleistocene megafaunal extinctions and adaptive shifts among PaleoAmericans in North America".

    Last year, I reported on widespread dissatisfaction with this impact hypothesis. Some critics didn't think that there was any evidence of megafaunal trauma from the impact, some didn't think that the dates matched any "adaptive shifts", and in particular the end of the Clovis culture.

    And then others didn't think that there had been an impact at all. These were in some ways the most worrisome, because they directly questioned the supposed evidence in support of an extraterrestrial event -- "microspherules" of magnetic material, clustered in sedimentary contexts at precisely 12,900 years ago in sites across much of North America.

    Now, in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (where Firestone and colleagues originally published their observations), Todd Surovell and colleagues have published a remarkable paper that tests the Firestone impact hypothesis: "An independent evaluation of the Younger Dryas extraterrestrial impact hypothesis." Most critiques attempt to find an alternative explanation for a set of original observations. In this paper, Surovell and colleagues merely attempt to replicate the original observations at multiple sites, and fail -- as their abstract tersely states,

    We were unable to reproduce any results of the Firestone et al. study and find no support for Younger Dryas extraterrestrial impact.

    Just like that -- it's about as hard-hitting as you're going to see in a scientific research paper.

    Of course, this paper only examined one out of a number of observations that Firestone and colleagues had adduced in support of the impact hypothesis. But in the introduction to their paper, Surovell and colleagues reference several other recent studies that re-examined other aspects of the evidence:

    A series of critiques of the original Firestone et al. article (1) have been published recently (8-10). Pinter and Ishman (8) argue that the suite of markers used to indicate impact are inconsistent with "any single impactor or any known event." Furthermore, they provide alternative explanations for many of the observed marker peaks. For example, glassy and metallic microspherules are known components of atmospheric dust derived from the constant influx of micrometeorites. An independent evaluation of the charcoal evidence was recently published by Marlon et al. (9). Examining concentrations of charcoal from 35 pollen cores across North America, they found no evidence for large-scale, continent-wide wildfires specifically associated with the onset of the [Younger Dryas].

    In the current case, the results are very simple: they went looking for a spike in the number of impact-generated particles coincident with the Younger Dryas. They looked at seven sites with long and continuous records of sedimentation across that interval. They found the supposed impact-generated particles, but not patterned with any kind of spike.

    They suggest a different model for the presence and accumulation of the magnetic particles:

    Alternatively, it may be that the presence, absence, and relative abundance of magnetic materials, especially the spherules, is due to characteristics of the parent material and depositional environment instead of some sort of continent-wide extraterrestrial process. The characteristics of the local depositional setting before, during, and after 12.9 ka have not been addressed by the proponents of the impact hypothesis. The zones producing the YDB ‘‘impact markers’’ are typically associated with soils (stable surfaces) or shifts in the depositional environment (e.g., alluvial to lacustrine conditions at Blackwater Draw, Lubbock Lake, Murray Springs, and Lake Hind; buried soils in the Carolina Bays and at Lommel, Belgium).

    One might imagine atmospheric particles accumulating on stable paleosols over long stretches of time, generating a local spike in the number of such particles in the stratigraphic column. In any event, the data presented here don't bear out the hypothesis of any unusually large impact event.

    I'm not a geologist, and I have no special insight into the analyses here, beyond reading the charts. But remember that the impact hypothesis made a tremendous media splash. Maybe more damaging to the scientific side of things, the hypothesis that the Younger Dryas cold period came from an extraterrestrial force, made it seem for a moment less necessary to investigate terrestrial sources of cooling at the terminal Pleistocene. The science will correct itself, but the public perception of the climate changes at the end of the Ice Ages will need quite a bit more nursing to get a more realistic perspective on the story.

    References:

    Firestone RB and lots of others. 2007. Evidence for an extraterrestrial impact 12,900 years ago that contributed to the megafaunal extinctions and the Younger Dryas cooling. Proc Nat Acad Sci USA, 104:16016-16021. doi:10.1073/pnas.0706977104

    Kerr RA. 2008. Experts find no evidence for a mammoth-killer impact. Science 319:1331-1332. doi:10.1126/science.319.5868.1331

    Surovell TA, Holliday VT, Gingerich JAM, Ketron C, Haynes CV, Jr, Hilman I, Wagner DP, Johnson E, Claeys P. 2009. An independent evaluation of the Younger Dryas extraterrestrial impact hypothesis. Proc Nat Acad Sci USA (early) doi:10.1073/pnas.0907857106

  • Did an ice age boost human brain size?

    Thu, 2009-07-30 20:48 -- John Hawks

    What is going on? I mean, the heat this summer seems to have gotten to people's heads. Except, it hasn't been that hot. Heck, nothing could be hot enough for this:

    Did an ice age boost human brain size?

    About a decade ago, biologists David Schwartzman and George Middendorf of Howard University in Washington DC hypothesised that our modern brain could not have evolved until the Quaternary ice age started, about 2.5 million years ago.

    And how did that work out for them? Well, we can do a quick Google Scholar check. Sure, it doesn't have to be cited to be true. I don't have anything against bioastronomy as a source for paleoanthropologists. Why should I? There are lots of smart bioastronomers. They've thought long and deeply about human brain evolution, I'm sure of it. Er...

    The two periods of pronounced Phanerozoic cooling, the PermoCarboniferous and late Cenozoic, corresponded to the emergence of mammal-like reptiles and hominids respectively, with a variety of explanations offered for the apparent link. The origin of highly encephalized whales, dolphins and porpoises occurred with the drop in ocean temperatures 25-30 mya.

    Of course it would help if the paper were actually about the Pliocene/Pleistocene boundary, instead of the whole Phanerozoic!

    Sweet mother of Madge. Thank goodness it can't get any worse. Er...d'oh!

    A new study by Schwartzman and Middendorf suggests that a small drop in global temperatures may have made a big difference. The pair used basic equations of heat loss to estimate how fast the small-brained Homo habilis would have been able to cool off. Assuming overheating limited the size of H. habilis's brain, they then calculated what drop in air temperature would have been needed for Homo erectus to be able to support its bigger brain (see diagram). They found that a drop in air temperature of just 1.5 °C would have done the trick (Climatic Change, vol 95, p 439).

    I think this paper may single-handedly destroy the credibility of Climatic Change. I mean, gee, it's not like people today live with mean temperatures that differ by 1.5 degrees. Wow, those tropical brains must be smokin'.

    Well, I guess there's always a bright side:

    Greenhouse brains

    If global cooling allowed humans to evolve their big brains, will today's global warming take them away again? "I'd hate to think that a difference of 1.5 °C might mean the end of humans because our brains cook," says George Middendorf of Howard University in Washington DC, "but I guess it's a scenario that might play out."

    OH NOES! Me brain, she be sizzlin' away like a hot ball o' buttah. WHAAAAAAH! hot Hot HOT HOT!

  • Bigfoot biogeography

    Fri, 2009-07-03 13:52 -- John Hawks

    So a couple of weeks ago, the Journal of Biogeography published a paper arguing that humans and orangutans are sister taxa.

    This week, the journal has published a paper on the biogeography of Sasquatch.

    Yes, that's correct. The same journal that published the updated "red ape" paper has now published a Bigfoot paper.

    OK, Journal of Biogeography, I'll be your straight man. I mean, I bow to no one in my ability to snark on human evolution, but this is like some sort of karmic singularity.

    Besides, this Bigfoot paper is really good. The authors intend it as a "tongue-in-cheek" example, and it works on that basis, as an illustration of the "garbage in, garbage out" principle. Biogeographers have been using increasingly sophisticated computer algorithms to predict the "ecological niche" of species. The algorithms take information about sightings or recorded incidences of a species, find commonalities among those sightings against maps of other ecological data (rainfall, forest type, presence of other species, etc.), and spit out an ecogeographic distribution for the target species.

    Of course, the algorithm will come to some result, regardless of how well each piece of data in the system is known. And the algorithms are complex enough that the creeping effects of errors may be hard to evaluate:

    While the value of publicly available sample locality data is not questioned, the consequent introduction of errors in the accuracy of specimen identity and georeferencing could be problematic for developing ENMs [that is, "ecological niche models"] from public data sources (Graham et al., 2004; Soberón & Peterson, 2004). Although georeferencing inaccuracies can be identified in databases from qualitative or quantitative accuracy thresholds (e.g. http://manisnet.org/GeorefGuide.html), poor taxonomy and/or misidentification may be less detectable. This issue may be particularly problematic, for example, with cryptic species or subspecies that are morphologically similar but may have very distinct ecological requirements and geographic distributions, or for those data sources that contain indirect observations rather than references only to physical specimens.

    What better way to illustrate the problem, than by applying the analytical methods straight to a "species" whose existence is, shall we say, "questionable."

    The authors additionally raise one particular element of confusion that may enter into ecological niche modeling -- sightings of similar species may confound each other. They consider the example of black bears -- another large North American mammal that occurs in many of the areas where Bigfoot sightings are reported. They run the same analysis on black bears as they did on Sasquatch, finding a large overlap in distributions. But interestingly, they have fewer observations for bears than they do for Bigfoot -- leading them to an underestimate of the actual range of black bears. They reflect on the possible interpretations of the overlap:

    Thus, the two 'species' do not demonstrate significant niche differentiation with respect to the selected bioclimatic variables. Although it is possible that Sasquatch and U. americanus share such remarkably similar bioclimatic requirements, we nonetheless suspect that many Bigfoot sightings are, in fact, of black bears.

    From my perspective, this paper is important for two reasons, neither of them really having to do with large North American primates. First is a social and legal angle. Increasingly, the habitat distributions of endangered or threatened species are evaluated on the basis of similar computer models of ecological niche. In particular, the changes in species distributions under scenarios of climate change are modeled in this way. This computer modeling has the appearance of objectivity, and it certainly allows reams of data to be statistically simplified into human-readable maps. That makes the results of such analyses really valuable to cases where political and legal units need to make decisions about how to comply with threatened species regulations.

    But if the data going into the model aren't correct, then the predictions of the models won't reflect reality. The question is, how much will they be wrong?

    In this case, the limited black bear dataset leads to a substantial underestimation of the black bear habitat niche. And possible confusion between Sasquatch and black bear sightings raises the possibility that any rare species will be significantly overrepresented in ecological niche modeling when such confusions are possible. Neither of these outcomes tells us how bad such errors are likely to be, but they point to real weaknesses in the maps generated by these computer algorithms.

    I expect that smart lawyers will be finding ways to use this Bigfoot paper a lot.

    Second, I think the paper is important at this moment in paleoanthropology. Late last year, I wrote about a paper that evaluated ecological niche models for Neandertals and people who made the Aurignacian ("'Competitive exclusion' and the extinction of Neandertals: should we believe it?"). The paper, by William Banks and colleagues, had used the observed distribution of archaeological sites between certain radiocarbon date intervals to estimate an ecological niche model for the two hominid groups.

    I think that paper was very good work, but it obviously is subject to uncertainties in the initial observations -- just as the Sasquatch data are. The archaeological observations add even more uncertainties of dating and certainty of association between biology and archaeology. And the Sasquatch data set is much, much larger in terms of sighting numbers; meaning that the archaeological cases ought to have more error, when it comes to evaluating niche flexibility.

    For the purposes of the Banks et al. (2008) paper, I think their conclusions are pretty secure. They tested the hypothesis that the reduction of Neandertal occurrences over time could be explained by climate change; they were able to reject that hypothesis by showing the ecological niche breadth of earlier Neandertals included paleoenvironments that were very widespread across Europe throughout the period when they were declining. It's a nice demonstration.

    But the Sasquatch example shows that we have to evaluate the ability of ecological niche modeling to test each hypothesis, on the basis of the data that are likely to be available. Can the model show that the spread of Aurignacian people caused the Neandertals to decline? That depends on our confidence about the dating and biological associations at early Aurignacian sites. The computer algorithm gives a structured way to reduce information that is already manifest in the data.

    References:

    Lozier JD, Aniello P, Hickerson MJ. 2009. Predicting the distribution of Sasquatch in western North America: anything goes with ecological niche modelling. J Biogeogr (early online) doi:10.1111/j.1365-2699.2009.02152.x

    Banks WE, d’Errico F, Peterson AT, Kageyama M, Sima A, et al. (2008) Neanderthal Extinction by Competitive Exclusion. PLoS ONE 3(12): e3972. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003972

  • Warfare, catastrophes, six of one, half dozen of the other

    Wed, 2009-06-10 17:30 -- John Hawks

    I'm reading through the paper by Samuel Bowles, "Did warfare among ancestral hunter-gatherers affect the evolution of human social behaviors?" I've done some work (cited in the paper) on population extinction and recolonization, so I'm reading carefully and checking parameters as I go. Personally, I'm skeptical that Pleistocene warfare would have spurred altruism. More on that later.

    Meanwhile, the first two paragraphs of the discussion stick out:

    The mortality data summarized in Table 1 are consistent with what is known about the Late Pleistocene from more indirect data. Frequent lethal intergroup encounters may reconcile two otherwise anomalous facts about hunter-gatherer demographics. Human population grew extraordinarily slowly or not at all for the 100,000 years prior to 20,000 years before the present (35, 36), yet under peaceful conditions foraging populations are capable of growth rates exceeding 2% per annum (37, 38).

    Further, the extraordinary volatility of climate during the Late Pleistocene (39) must have resulted in natural disasters and periodic resource scarcities, known strong predictors of intergroup conflict among hunter-gatherers in the historical record (40), and undoubtedly forced long-distance migrations and occasioned frequent encounters between groups having no established political relations.

    That's called the "everything but the kitchen sink" argument. Warfare stopped the population from growing! Warfare inevitably followed resource scarcities!

    Didn't any of the reviewers notice that, uh, resource scarcity limits population growth even in the absence of warfare? These two factors explain each other just fine. Warfare is mediated by resource scarcity and population growth, sure, but they don't constitute arguments in favor of widespread warfare in the Pleistocene, any more than they are arguments for widespread warfare in beavers and ducks. Every species in nature can grow fast when resources aren't limited, most a lot faster than us.

    References:

    Bowles S. 2009. Did warfare among ancestral hunter-gatherers affect the evolution of human social behaviors? Science 324:1293-1298. doi:10.1126/science.1168112

  • Paleoclimate in southern Africa

    Sat, 2009-04-18 21:45 -- John Hawks

    The Tswaing Crater is around 40 km from Pretoria, South Africa. It was created by an asteroid impact some 200,000 years ago, which released roughly the energy of the Tunguska explosion of 1908. The crater's floor has a salt pan, where people have gone to gather salt since MSA times. The floor has been cored, with analyses of sediment salinity and pollen, giving a record of climate over the last 200,000 years. For example, a 2007 paper by Kristen and colleagues:

    Sediments from Lake Tswaing (25°24'30'' S, 28°04'59'' E) document hydrological changes in southern Africa over the last 200 Ka. Using high-resolution XRF- scanning, basic geochemistry (TIC, TOC, TN), organic petrology and rock-eval pyrolysis, we identify intervals of decreased carbonate precipitation, increased detrital input, decreased salinity and decreased autochthonous (algal and bacterial) organic matter content that represent periods of less stable water column stratification and increased rainfall. Between 200 and 80 Ka BP, these intervals appear to be contemporaneous with local summer insolation maxima, indicating a strong influence of precessional variability (~23 Ka) on African subtropical climate. This influence weakens during the last glacial period (~80 to 10 Ka BP), when humid intervals at 73 to 68 Ka, 54 to 50 Ka, 37 to 35 Ka and 15 to 10 Ka BP are largely out of phase with insolation changes, and presumably reflect southward displacement of the ITCZ (Inter Tropical Convergence Zone) and/or changes in ocean circulation.

    I'm pointing to this study because it is one that documents wetter periods during the span between the Howieson's Poort (roughly 60,000 years ago) and the Last Glacial Maximum (around 18,000 years ago). There are some who have claimed that this was a long span of aridity in southern Africa -- but more recent evidence makes it clear that the climate was not unimodal but fluctuated as in earlier and later time frames. Also, the climate was simply not arid, compared to "megadrought" periods documented in East Africa before 70,000 years ago.

    Thanks to a reader, I've been reading an excellent 2008 paper by Peter Mitchell, which documents archaeological sites and paleoclimate data leading to the conclusion that habitation in southern Africa was not significantly interrupted during late MSA times. I'll refer to it more extensively later, but in the meantime I'm noting some recent work that Mitchell may not have had available when he was writing his article.

    In a similar vein, I can point to an article by Louis Scott and colleagues (2008), which examined pollen records from Tswaing Crater as well as the Wonderkrater spring, and speleothem isotope evidence from Lobatse Cave, Botswana. Correlating the records from different sites in the same general area -- in this case, all from the savanna biome of southern Africa -- is very important. Distant climate records, such as the Greenland or Vostok ice cores, give some indication of global climate fluctuations, but it is not usually obvious how these fluctuations will affect specific regions of the world. One lake sediment core from southern Africa helps to show the local climatic fluctuations, but some may be highly localized, while others may reflect regional water and temperature variations. Hence, the correlations among many sites in a single region allow us to talk about climate fluctuations on a scale relevant to human populations.

    Again, the region-wide picture in southern Africa between 60,000 and 20,000 years ago does not yield a picture of static, arid or cool conditions. The time period covers almost two full precessional cycles of insolation in southern Africa, and thus covers a wide range of local climate variation. To sum up, I'll cite Mitchell (2008:54), who relied on some earlier work from the Tswaing Crater record:

    Peak annual precipitation may have reached 650–720 mm, with the late MIS 3 peak at the low end of this range. The minimum precipitation experienced was about 535 mm; today’s figure for comparison is 630 mm. Thus, although there were certainly periods when rainfall was reduced compared to the present , such reductions still exceeded by some margin the levels experienced by much of Limpopo Province or the highveld today, and for about a third of the time rainfall was actually higher than at present. Moreover, a generally cooler climate should have reduced evapotranspiration, and thus enhanced effective precipitation, more than these raw estimates suggest.

    These sources are relevant for the savanna of the northern and eastern parts of South Africa. The region is ecologically diverse, and Mitchell considers different parts of the region in turn.

    References:

    Kristen I, Fuhrmann A, Thorpe J, Röhl U, Wilkes H, Oberhänsli H. 2007. Hydrological changes in southern Africa over the last 200 Ka as recorded in lake sediments from the Tswaing impact crater. S Afr J Geol 110:311-326. doi:10.2113/gssajg.110.2-3.311

    Mitchell P. 2008. Developing the archaeology of marine isotope stage 3. S Afr Archaeol Soc Goodwin Ser 10:52-65.

    Scott L, Holmgren K, Partridge TC. 2008. Reconciliation of vegetation and climatic interpretations of pollen profiles and other regional records from the last 60 thousand years in the Savanna Biome of Southern Africa. Palaeogeography, Palaeoclimatology, Palaeoecology 257:198-206. doi:10.1016/j.palaeo.2007.10.018

  • Little Ice Age

    Tue, 2009-02-10 12:12 -- John Hawks

    New Scientist is running a nice article titled, "1709: The year that Europe froze." It hits many interesting points -- at the very dawn of systematic temperature records, we have consistent recordings of the winter from several observers across Europe. And then there are the descriptions:

    In more humble homes, people went to bed and woke to find their nightcaps frozen to the bed-head. Bread froze so hard it took an axe to cut it. According to a canon from Beaune in Burgundy, "travellers died in the countryside, livestock in the stables, wild animals in the woods; nearly all the birds died, wine froze in barrels and public fires were lit to warm the poor". From all over the country came reports of people found frozen to death. And with roads and rivers blocked by snow and ice, it was impossible to transport food to the cities. Paris waited three months for fresh supplies.

    It is harrowing to think of just how terrible one bad winter could be for agricultural productivity across the Northern Hemisphere. We have more buffering today than pre-industrial Europe, but an unexpected blockage of sunlight from volcanoes or impacts could happen at any time.

  • Late advance of the Swedish ice

    Sat, 2009-01-10 22:09 -- John Hawks

    News on an interesting dissertation about the last glaciation:

    According to the previously accepted hypothesis, Sweden was covered with ice 75,000-20,000 years ago. Martina Hättestrand’s hypothesis, on the other hand, is that Sweden may have largely been ice-free between 59,000 and 40,000 years ago. If this is true, the last ice sheet of the Ice Age formed much more rapidly than was previously believed in order to have reached all the way down to northern Germany during the maximum phase about 22,000 years ago.

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Neandertals

For years, I've worked on their bones. Now I'm working on their genes. Read more about the science studying these ancient people.

Denisova

From a finger bone of an ancient human came the record of a completely unexpected population. My lab is working on the science of the Denisova genome.

Acceleration

The advent of agriculture caused natural selection to speed up greatly in humans. We're uncovering some of the ways that populations have rapidly changed during the last 10,000 years.

Malapa

Just outside Johannesburg, the Malapa site is producing some of the most exciting finds in human evolution. This site is the headquarters of the Malapa Soft Tissue Project.