john hawks weblog

paleoanthropology, genetics and evolution

language

  • Mankind in the unmaking

    Tue, 2012-11-20 19:59 -- John Hawks

    Annalee Newitz gives a worthwhile etymological lesson: "Think twice before using “mankind” to mean “all humanity,” say scholars".

    In modern English, man is used very infrequently as an autohyponym. Possibly that's because it's become too confusing to use "man" — it's hard to know what it means in any given context when we have no word like wæpenmann that refers exclusively to males. But we do have the words "person" and "human" that clearly refer to both sexes, so those have eclipsed "man" when speaking about everyone.

    More at the link. "Mankind" used to be very common in paleoanthropology, most notably in the title of W.W. Howells' Mankind in the Making: The Story of Human Evolution, last published in 1967. Howells cribbed his title from H. G. Wells, whose own Mankind in the Making came out in 1909. It's available for free on the Kindle, or from Project Gutenberg in multiple formats. A name with a long pedigree, that we simply don't use anymore. Star Trek was a few years behind science when it gave up the "no man has gone before".

    I guess that popular culture is usually recycling the science of a decade ago. We've just gotten to where popular culture treatments of human evolution suffer through a volcanic winter, and where Neandertals are extinct. Guess that makes a fertile ground for rewriting over the next decade!

  • Left-handed termite-fishing

    Mon, 2012-11-05 16:26 -- John Hawks

    Stephanie Bogart and colleagues, working at the chimpanzee field site of Fongoli, Senegal, have a new paper on handedness in these wild primates [1]. Paleoanthropologists have long been interested in handedness as it may provide evidence about lateralization of function in the brain. It is interesting that humans are highly brain lateralized for language and for tool use, suggesting that these functions may be connected in their evolutionary history.

    Chimpanzees have a homolog of Broca's area, which does not show substantial lateralization in structure [2]. But chimpanzees do show a hand preference in many of their behaviors, including when they are communicating with gestures [3]. Some studies have tied that kind of lateralization of gesture behavior to evidence for lateralization in brain function [4]. A criticism is that these kinds of studies are done with captive chimpanzees, and may not reflect the evolution of hand preference or communication in natural contexts.

    Which brings me to the reason for pointing to Bogart and colleagues' work, which includes my favorite element, the one-paragraph mini-review of the literature:

    In support of this argument, some authors suggest that data from captive and wild primates, especially chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), produce conflicting results with regards to data on handedness (McGrew and Marchant,1997). Studies in captive chimpanzees reveal population-level right handedness for a number of actions or tasks including throwing, coordinated bimanual activities, manual gestures and grooming (Hopkins,2006; Hopkins et al.,2007, 2010, 2011, 2012). In contrast, reports in wild chimpanzees fail to show population-level bias in spontaneous activities such as scratching, simple reaching, or plucking (Mahale, Tanzania: Corp and Byrne,2004; Gombe, Tanzania: Marchant and McGrew,1996; McGrew and Marchant,2001) or on measures of tool use such as nut-cracking (Bossou, Guinea: Biro et al.,2003; Humle and Matsuzawa,2009), termite fishing (Gombe, Tanzania: McGrew and Marchant,1992; McGrew and Marchant,1996), ant dipping (Mahale, Tanzania: Marchant and McGrew,2007) and leaf sponging (Bossou, Guinea: Biro et al.,2003; Tai, Ivory Coast: Boesch,1991), though some question these claims (Hopkins and Cantalupo,2005; Hopkins,2006). One limitation in attempting to compare findings between wild and captive chimpanzees is the fact that the measures often differ between settings. Most studies of handedness in the wild focus on tool use while hand preference research with captive chimpanzees rarely simulates tasks that model different forms of tool use demonstrated in African populations (Hopkins and Cantalupo,2005). A second limitation of studies in wild chimpanzees is that the sample sizes are often small, and therefore detecting population-level preferences is difficult due to a lack of statistical power (Hopkins,1999; Hopkins and Cantalupo,2005). Indeed, when data on some tool use measures, such as leaf dipping, ant dipping, and termite fishing are combined across study sites or from different studies, population-level handedness is found in wild chimpanzees (Hopkins and Cantalupo,2005).

    They find that at Fongoli chimpanzees prefer to termite-fish using their left hands. This is consistent with earlier observations at Gombe, Tanzania, and the authors suggest that it may reflect a greater sensitivity to tactile feedback in the right hemisphere of the chimpanzee brain, as has been shown in some human work. Either that, or it is really a two-handed task in which the right is taking on more of a grasping role:

    Second, we have observed that some of the chimpanzees will, after extracting the termite stick, rest it on their opposite hand or wrist and then eat the termites by bringing their wrist to their mouth. In this explanation, the chimpanzees may use their left hand for the probing action to leave the right hand free to aid in consuming the biting insects. In this sense, the hands are working in a complementary, bimanual fashion. In addition to this, the nonprobing hand is often used to pick up termites that are on the outside of the mound, thus the left hand preference for probing could be a result of a right hand preference for grasping. The cognitive and motor factors discussed here may influence termite fishing laterality in conjunction with each other.

    That puts a different spin on the evolution of handedness in humans, considering that stone tool manufacture is certainly a two-handed task, as are most actual uses of stone tools for cutting and chopping.


    References

  • Chomping Chomsky

    Mon, 2012-09-03 13:07 -- John Hawks

    I ran into Deevy Bishop's review of a recent book by Noam Chomsky and James McGilvray, titled The Science of Language: Interviews with James McGilvray.

    As someone who works on child language disorders, I have tried many times to read Chomsky in order to appreciate the insights that he is so often credited with. I regret to say that, over the years, I have come to the conclusion that, far from enhancing our understanding of language acquisition, his ideas have led to stagnation, as linguists have gone through increasingly uncomfortable contortions to relate facts about children’s language to his theories. The problem is that the theories are derived from a consideration of adult language, and take no account of the process of development. There is a fundamental problem with an essential premise about what is learned that has led to years of confusion and sterile theorizing.

    Bishop's post led me to a review of the book by Language Log writer Geoffrey Pullum, "The Science of Language: Interviews with James McGilvray". The review is bad:

    It continues thus, jargon jostling with loose conjecture and dogmatic assertions. Chomsky avers that words never refer to anything in the world; that "the entire discussion of the last century or so" about relations between physics and chemistry "was crazy"; that Darwin was wrong and evolution by natural selection (like Skinnerian behaviourism) cannot work; that there was no "serious research" on morality before 2000; that the practice of debating "is a tribute to human irrationality"; etc.

    It gives rise to a spectacular train wreck of a comment thread, with a heated exchange between Pullum and McGilvray.

    I'm starting my Biology of Mind course tomorrow, and so once again I'll be posting more neuroscience and psychology-related material than usual. Chomsky is quite a lot like Freud -- he has written an immense corpus, developed an idiosyncratic model of the mind, and is surrounded by a coterie of true believers. He has been the most prominent objector to the idea that language evolved as an adaptation in ancient humans. Understanding this view helps to focus attention on how we use adaptive models in biology and how they can apply to behavior.

    And how model-builders can shift some assumptions to adapt to changing scientific data.

  • Spielke profile

    Sat, 2012-05-05 12:25 -- John Hawks

    The New York Times has a long profile of developmental psychologist Elizabeth Spielke, whose work with babies has opened a window on early cognition ("Insights from the youngest minds"). The article is wide-ranging and worth sharing. I thought I'd make an note of Spielke's version of the "cathedral" model in which distinct cognitive functions are combined by executive consciousness into synthetic abilities. She denotes language as the functional glue holding the brain's abilities together:

    Dr. Spelke is also seeking to understand how the core domains of the human mind interact to yield our uniquely restless and creative intelligence — able to master calculus, probe the cosmos and play a Bach toccata as no bonobo or New Caledonian crow can. Even though “our core systems are fundamental yet limited,” as she put it, “we manage to get beyond them.”

    Dr. Spelke has proposed that human language is the secret ingredient, the cognitive catalyst that allows our numeric, architectonic and social modules to join forces, swap ideas and take us to far horizons. “What’s special about language is its productive combinatorial power,” she said. “We can use it to combine anything with anything.”

    She's in a position to test that by looking at prelinguistic children. I think there's much truth in the idea, but some functional integration must take place in any conscious organism, even without language. Language allows a complexity of expression, but complexity does not necessarily mean integration.

  • New animal communication books

    Sat, 2012-04-07 17:49 -- John Hawks

    Anthropologist Barbara J. King reviews two new books on animal communication in the Washington Post: "'Calls Beyond Our Hearing: Unlocking the Secrets of Animal Hearing' by Holly Merino and 'The Song of the Ape : Understanding the Language of Chimpanzees' by Andrew R. Halloran".

    Meaning-making, though, isn’t necessarily language. Cetacean scientists in Canada remark that they can understand the vocal systems of beluga whales only by taking the animals’ cognition into account. But when Menino asks if the belugas are “doing something like comprehending language,” one scientist tells her flatly: “Nope. Not like language. You don’t even need to go there.”

    In “Song of the Ape,” Halloran, a primatologist, does go there. “I . . . feel confident,” he asserts, “in granting language to chimpanzees.”

    Interesting that these books are coming out this year. I update my animal communication notes every time I teach Biology of Mind, and for the past few iterations there has been strikingly little change. There are many more details to learn about how communication functions in different social species, but most recent developments have been to broaden the scope of known animal communication by showing well-understood communication strategies in new lineages of animals. How these strategies evolve -- often conversantly -- in both neural and social terms, is a key frontier of knowledge.

  • Quote: Edward Sapir on language and social reality

    Wed, 2012-03-28 00:03 -- John Hawks

    Edward Sapir [1]:

    Language is a guide to ‘social reality’. Though language is not ordinarily thought of as of essential interest to the students of social science, it powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes. Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the ‘real world’ is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group. No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different labels attached.


    References

    1. Sapir E. The Status of Linguistics as a Science. Language. 1929;5:207-214.
  • The cultural tool

    Sat, 2012-03-24 23:28 -- John Hawks

    The Guardian interviews Daniel Everett about his new book, Language: The Cultural Tool. Which I will mention, has one of the worst covers ever. It's like the publisher is trying to keep it on the shelves:

    Anyway, Everett is well-known for his long-term work among the Pirahã, whose distinctive language has challenged many of linguists' assumptions about the nature of human language. Well, generative linguists' assumptions, anyway. The interview discusses the challenge Everett's findings pose for Chomsky's theories of language.

    So what do you think is the lesson of all this from a linguistic point of view?

    The lesson is that language is not something mysterious that is outside the bounds of natural selection, or just popped into being through some mutated gene. But that language is a human invention to solve a human problem. Other creatures can't use it for the same reason they can't use a shovel: it was invented by humans, for humans and its success is judged by humans.

    The Chronicle of Higher Education has a longer article covering Everett's book: "Angry Words". In the article, we see that a theoretical debate in linguistics has turned into a full-blown fracas:

    In 2007, Everett heard reports of a letter signed by Cilene Rodrigues, who is Brazilian, and who co-wrote the paper with Pesetsky and Nevins, that accuses him of racism. According to Everett, he got a call from a source informing him that Rodrigues, an honorary research fellow at University College London, had sent a letter to the organization in Brazil that grants permission for researchers to visit indigenous groups like the Pirahã. He then discovered that the organization, called FUNAI, the National Indian Foundation, would no longer grant him permission to visit the Pirahã, whom he had known for most of his adult life and who remain the focus of his research.

    He still hasn't been able to return. Rodrigues would not respond directly to questions about whether she had signed such a letter, nor would Nevins. Rodrigues forwarded an e-mail from another linguist who has worked in Brazil, which speculates that Everett was denied access to the Pirahã because he did not obtain the proper permits and flouted the law, accusations Everett calls "completely false" and "amazingly nasty lies."

    The Chronicle article is really juicy, with lots of linguists saying bad things about both Everett and Chomsky. It really misses the action in present-day linguistics, however, because the Piraha are only a small part of the overall challenge to Chomsky's ideas.

  • How interestiaaang

    Mon, 2012-02-27 21:19 -- John Hawks

    The Science NY Times covers the "vocal fry" trend in an article on how young women are the leading edge of linguistic change.

    But “language changes very fast,” said Dr. Eckert of Stanford, and most people — particularly adults — who try to divine the meaning of new forms used by young women are “almost sure to get it wrong.”

    “What may sound excessively ‘girly’ to me may sound smart, authoritative and strong to my students,” she said.

    I love how what conveyed the authority of upper class British men a generation ago is now the way for some young women to show they are beyond caring about it all. I put on quite a show for my Anthropology 105 students today displaying the au courant usage.

  • The thrifty brainotype

    Wed, 2012-01-18 23:58 -- John Hawks

    Andy Clark, a philosopher of the mind, has entered a useful essay in the NY Times online commentary section: "Do thrifty brains make better minds?"

    "Thrifty" in the headline refers to efficiency of information processing. That's a departure from the standard anthropological version of the story, in which "expensive brains" are optimized for energy efficiency. These ideas are not mutually exclusive: a strategy toward bit-saving might well reduce the neural overhead, so to speak. But a brain that follows a strategy of greatest information efficiency might in some respects be more energetically expensive. More important, an evolutionary process that results in a brain with high information efficiency might follow a very different pathway than a process that would give rise to high energy efficiency.

    Clark considers the philosophical implications of this "thrifty" model of neural processing, particularly as applied to the relative roles of perception and cognition:

    All this, if true, has much more than merely engineering significance. For it suggests that perception may best be seen as what has sometimes been described as a process of “controlled hallucination” (Ramesh Jain) in which we (or rather, various parts of our brains) try to predict what is out there, using the incoming signal more as a means of tuning and nuancing the predictions rather than as a rich (and bandwidth-costly) encoding of the state of the world. This in turn underlines the surprising extent to which the structure of our expectations (both conscious and non-conscious) may quite literally be determining much of what we see, hear and feel.

    Clark does not really touch on the evolutionary constraints that affected brain evolution. He discusses perception and cognition as related engineering problems for which efficient information encoding is the principal constraint. From this point of view, certain well-known perceptual illusions (he uses the "hollow-face illusion" as an example) make great sense.

    It may be more useful to rephrase the headline. Thrifty brains may not make better minds, but they do yield a certain kind of mind. There are some things about which it is better not to be fooled. In a world where the brain evolved under natural selection, we should expect some kinds of perception to be more subject to mental abbreviation and shorthand than others. Illusions give us not only insight into how our brains work, but also how they evolved.

    Meanwhile, human minds include much information that will not be found in other primates. This includes at least one modality of information (language) not found elsewhere in nature. It seems unlikely that our brains should have been optimized for processing this kind of information in the limited time available. The kinds of tricks visual perception uses to make visual processing more efficient may be analogous to "verbal illusions" in language processing, and maybe there is some evidence there about the pathway taken by language evolution. For a new perceptual modality to come into our population de novo, bootstrapping itself in every growing child, I expect that many steps along that pathway were determined by limitations and constraints.

    What we perceive today as elegant, natural selection created as simply as gravity creates a river. The water will flow downhill, every other parameter is free.

    Synopsis: 
    Were brains constrained by information efficiency, or energy efficiency?
  • Questioning phylogenetic inferences about language

    Sat, 2011-11-26 21:59 -- John Hawks

    Bruce Bower of Science News enters an article covering the last year of application of phylogenetic methods to questions of language evolution: "Darwin's Tongues".

    He gives a description of work by Quentin Atkinson and Russell Gray and colleagues, which have attempted to place the origination of modern human languages (in Africa, naturally), and separately have challenged the Chomskian assertion that human languages are constrained by deep structure. A number of linguists challenge these conclusions, and Bower describes the debates ably.

    Others suspect Atkinson’s analytical approach could be fruitful if informed by more sophisticated assumptions about how languages change. “I think many linguists would praise Atkinson’s contribution if it weren’t for the fact that his conclusions are so outlandish and contrary to linguistic intuition,” says linguist Michael Cysouw of Ludwig Maximilians University Munich in Germany.

    I think criticism of these approaches is in the "throw everything and see what sticks" phase. I've seen it before, in the modern human origins arena. In this phase, many of the criticisms lack force -- they emerge from skepticism about the conclusions, not necessarily an understanding of the method. That means the method has not yet been described in ways sufficient for linguists to understand its limitations, nor has it been applied in contexts where the answer is already well known from other approaches. Personally, I think the phylogenetic methods being applied to linguistic corpus data are statistically very useful and powerful, but that doesn't mean the alternative hypotheses have been differentiated cleanly from each other.

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Neandertals

For years, I've worked on their bones. Now I'm working on their genes. Read more about the science studying these ancient people.

Denisova

From a finger bone of an ancient human came the record of a completely unexpected population. My lab is working on the science of the Denisova genome.

Acceleration

The advent of agriculture caused natural selection to speed up greatly in humans. We're uncovering some of the ways that populations have rapidly changed during the last 10,000 years.

Malapa

Just outside Johannesburg, the Malapa site is producing some of the most exciting finds in human evolution. This site is the headquarters of the Malapa Soft Tissue Project.